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In my paper I propose to explore how four influential 20th century philosophers and psychotherapists 
in Japan, Nishida Kitarō, Nishitani Keiji, Morita Masatake and Yoshimoto Ishin have given shape to 
their meditations on nothingness, emptiness and the self, and in what ways did their works point to 
similar directions when it comes to the question of fending off the dangers of nihilism and finding a 
new meaning in life. After introducing various concepts of nihilism and setting the historical and 
intellectual context of the era, I shall delve into the theoretical configurations of the self in relation to 
nothingness and emptiness in Nishida’s, Morita’s, Nishitani’s and Yoshimoto’s views. The paper will 
conclude with the delineation of some common features in the four thinkers’ oeuvre that could assist 
the self in getting rid of the threat of nihilism by transforming itself into an emotionally and 
existentially more stable mode of being. 




Some ten years after listening to Heidegger’s lectures at the University of 
Freiburg on Nietzsche and nihilism, Nishitani Keiji, one of modern Japan’s most 
original and insightful philosophers, has decided to give a series of lectures in 
Kyoto which got published in 1949 under the title Nihilism.1 The text warns 
against the imminent dangers of nihilism and explains its particular relevance to 
Japan. In his precautionary remarks and in-depth analysis Nishitani makes it clear 
that nihilism is not merely a European or western phenomenon: it has spread way 
beyond its point of historical emergence, and thus holds serious threats to the 
cultural lives and national identities of other countries, among them Japan, as well. 
Why is that so? How could European nihilism be a serious hazard to the Japanese 
culture? Nishitani explains that it is because Japan is already in a deep crisis. In 
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fact, Japan has been in crisis for some time, but the crisis had gone largely 
unnoticed. Consequently, Japan is unaware in terms of the extent of the spiritual 
malaise and the menacing ennui that has been swirling forebodingly under the 
surface of its manifest historical events.2 The movement of nihilism conceals 
itself extraordinarily well, and therein lies the essence of its danger: that it can 
escalate in a barely noticeable yet fairly rapid manner. Nishitani expounds: 
 
Up until the middle of the Meiji period a spiritual basis and highly 
developed tradition was alive in the hearts and minds of the people. 
Indeed, the reason Japan was able to take in western culture with such 
unprecedented alacrity was that people then were possessed of true 
ability born of spiritual substance. However, as Europeanization (and 
Americanization) proceeded, this spiritual core began to decay in 
subsequent generations, until it is now a vast, gaping void in our ground. 
3 
This “vast, gaping void” at the core of one’s existence is not a matter that could 
be labeled as unique to this historical period or could be simply understood as the 
consequence of a mere chronological chain of events that comes from the past and 
leads to the now. For Nishitani, as for his predecessors like Nietzsche and 
Heidegger, the nature of nihilism could be conceived in essentially twofold ways: 
one, it can be seen as universal and existential; two, as particular and historical. 
This duality is something that can and should be grasped in one single vision in 
order to understand how nihilism operates in actual reality; neither aspect of its 
movement ought to be downplayed. What is crucial here is that the problem 
should not be objectified and externalized as though it were just another problem 
among many others. The question of nihilism is the most urgent, the most personal 
and radical of all.4 
“On the one hand, nihilism is a problem that transcends time and space and is 
rooted in the essence of human being, an existential problem in which the being 
of the self is revealed to the self itself as something groundless.”5 For Nishitani, 
                                                     
2 Nishitani (1990), p. 177: “As noted above, our crisis is compounded by the fact that not only are we 
in it but we do not know that our situation is critical. Thus our first task is to realize that the crisis exists 
in us, that modern Japan is a living contradiction with a hollowness in its spiritual foundations.”   
3 Op.cit., p. 175. 
4 Op.cit., p. 2: “In short, nihilism refuses treatment as merely an external problem for one's self, or even 
contemplation as a problem internal to each individual self. This is the essence of nihilism. (…) Nihilism 
demands that each individual carry out an experiment within the self.” 
5 Op.cit., p. 3. 
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the existential side is clearly very important and not something to be neglected. 
Nevertheless, the void is always there for the individual as the groundless ground 
of its personal existence. Although this fact is habitually covered up and made 
forgotten by the cultural structures of the civilization into which one is born, when 
these structures experience a deep and lasting inner crisis one cannot avoid to see 
the true groundless nature of one’s existence. At times like this the uncomfortable 
truth comes to the fore, namely, that where one assumed to have fixed and reliable 
ontological foundations to be present there is nothing save for a formless void. 
Recognizing the presence of the abyss is agonizing, yet it is the only way that can 
revitalize the creative spiritual energies of both the individual and the civilization 
in toto. 
 
The essential thing is to overcome our inner void, and here European 
nihilism is of critical relevance in that it can impart a radical twist to our 
present situation and thereby point a way toward overcoming the 
spiritual hollowness. This is the second significance that nihilism holds 
for us. The reason the void was generated in the spiritual foundation of 
the Japanese in the first place was that we rushed earnestly into 
westernization and in the process forgot ourselves.6  
 
Nishitani’s thoroughgoing analysis, no matter how convincing and alarming it 
may sound, has been formulated in a cultural milieu and historical era that is 
obviously not identical to the one we live in at the current moment, some seventy 
or eighty years after his thoughts were put down on paper. But is this era so 
entirely different than the one in which Nishitani lived? Has the danger of nihilism, 
in its second, historical sense, been successfully fended off and done away from 
among our primary cultural concerns? There may be some voices today again that 
would argue that historical nihilism is still lurking around, it still has not been 
overcome or replaced by anything more constructive and reassuring compared 
with the “gaping void”.7 These voices might feel inclined to claim that a major 
shift has never taken place, but, instead, the long lasting decadent and self-
destructive trends of the western world resulted in the evident multiplication and 
the deepening of the various crises that seem to produce new challenges by the 
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day.8  
Among these voices James Tartaglia’s is one of the most salient nowadays. 
He contends in his 2016 book Philosophy in a Meaningless Life that instead of 
rejecting nihilism or trying to fight it, one should rather embrace it, because 
human life is indeed meaningless. “There is no overall point to human life. We 
are each of us born into a certain specific situation, at a particular place, in a 
particular historical epoch, and with particular parents, and from this unchosen 
starting point we must continue to exist until our time runs out.”9 Tartaglia goes 
on to argue that although human life does not have an unequivocal comprehensive 
meaning, this is no reason to despair after all. Nihilism has the power to 
reinvigorate not only philosophy but one’s attitude towards life’s goals as well. 
The philosophy of the meaning of life is inherently connected with the fact that 
we are living in a nihilistic age, but according to Tartaglia, this is not an issue that 
should be overcome. Nihilism is a fact of human life, and if one intends to improve 
the current situation, one ought to see nihilism in a positive light, in lieu of 
attempting to replace it with a purportedly more sensible approach to life: an 
approach that no one really knows what it consists in.  
Some might even argue that non-western cultures, like Japan, which have 
been profoundly influenced by most aspects, both positive and negative, of 
western civilization, could not yet actually renew and regenerate themselves, but 
are still fundamentally at the same historical situation by and large where they had 
been sixty or eighty years ago. It may be plausibly posited that Japan is still 
searching for its own identity, and this long-going/ongoing search has not been 
without its difficulties and drawbacks. As professor Kazushige Shingu, renowned 
psychotherapist and psychiatrist from Nara University, has noted not long ago: 
There is an increasing social demand for identity because in Japan we faced, 
initially, the collapse of the traditional construction of society based on 
Confucianism and Buddhism, later the opposition between East and West, 
between Communist and Liberal world. Now also this structure crashed and we 
are facing the overwhelming power of Neoliberalism. (…)We are living a deeply 
ambivalent and contradictory situation and it is true that, in this situation, we have 
                                                     
8 Possenti (2014), p. 211: “Having captured the spiritual sensibilities of an entire age, nihilism has now 
become the prevailing cultural climate in which we live. It is the air we breathe from birth, the 
irreplaceable lens through which we view every problem. Nihilism is thus the term that best sums up 
human civilization’s march toward decadence; it is a negative nihilism that saps us of the will to live 
and work.” 
9 Tartaglia (2016), p. 21. 
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the tendency to close into ourselves, as if we were psychoanalyzing ourselves (…) 
I think this is a cause of suffering.10  
Discovering – or creating anew – its own identity and an overall meaning of 
life while trying to find a way out of the distressing situation that causes 
widespread suffering and increased mental disturbances among the population is 
a cardinal goal for which Japan has been striving for a considerable time through 
various channels. If we follow them, some of these channels will lead us into the 
camps of Kyoto School philosophy, while others into the mental health care 
circles of Morita and Naikan therapies. In what follows we will investigate how 
Nishida Kitarō, along with Nishitani Keiji, worked on a potentially promising 
philosophical way out of nihilism, while Morita Masatake and Yoshimoto Ishin 
have developed two dissimilar, yet apparently converging therapeutic approaches 
that are embedded in the Buddhist tradition. All these scholarly and pragmatic 
endeavors have yielded a seemingly new, yet, at its core, a rather ancient 
foundation to a form of ethics which aims to cope with the challenges posed by 
nihilism. This ethics, as we will soon have an opportunity to observe, does not 
intend to cover up the existential void of nihilism but, instead, attempts to build a 
bridge over it while leaving the void in plain sight. Nevertheless, before turning 
our attention to the intellectual labor carried out by Nishida, Nishitani, Morita and 
Yoshimoto of bridging the void of nihilism, first we need to deepen our 
understanding regarding the true nature of the threat, in order to see how nihilism 
has come to be the notoriously dreaded cultural phenomenon of the modern period 
 
2. The Advancement of the History of Nihilism  
 
The modern epoch brought into being a world in which the effects of 
nihilism are spreading. Now, we can see, today, if we look with care and 
thought, that nihilism is a rage against Being: ‘nihilism’ means the 
destruction of Being: the Being of all beings, including that way of being 
which we call ‘human’ and consider to be our own.11 
 
If there is a single philosopher who is routinely associated with the notion of 
nihilism then that person is, without doubt, Friedrich Nietzsche. Nietzsche’s 
musings on the emergence of nihilism from the cultural logic of Christianity is as 
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well-known as his prophesied solution for the problem of nihilism which he 
declared to have found in the overcoming of man by the overman (Übermensch) 
and in creating new values instead of the hollowed-out old ones. Nietzsche was 
confessedly a nihilist himself in the sense of striving to actively assist the 
unavoidable progress of nihilism to come to its fruition with the explicit aim of 
propelling the development of European history to its subsequent, post-nihilistic 
stage. Nietzsche saw himself as much an outstanding herald of the times 
disseminating the news about the imminent advent of the mass decline of 
European civilization as the chosen thinker in whom the nihilistic tendencies of 
the west have culminated. Notwithstanding his apparent merits in laying bare the 
scarcely perceptible progression of the movement of nihilism, it would be a 
mistake to fall for Nietzsche’s less than modest, somewhat self-aggrandizing 
presentation concerning the origins of nihilism. As Slocombe reminds us, 
“Nihilism did not originate with Nietzsche, however, and neither did it end with 
him. Before Nietzsche, philosophies of nihilism are evident from classical Greece 
to Enlightenment Europe; since Nietzsche, and especially since the Holocaust, 
nihilism is no longer a marginalized philosophy, but one that has become central 
to an understanding of the history of modernity and twentieth- and twenty-first-
century culture.”12 
The first usage of the term “nihilism” in its philosophical sense can be traced 
back to a letter, dated 21st of March 1799, written by Jacobi and addressed to 
Fichte. In this letter Jacobi criticized Fichte for the kind of transcendental idealism, 
initiated by Kant and sustained by Fichte himself, which seeks to address all 
philosophical questions without involving anything external (i.e. God) to the self. 
This kind of transcendental idealism becomes, according to Jacobi, a form of 
‘nihilism’ (Nihilismus). For if God is removed from philosophy, philosophy 
becomes sheer egoism or solipsism, and there remains nothing upon which the 
inquiring self could stand on. Consequently the self, without God, turns into an 
“empty self”, and, vice versa, God, without its absolute validity, changes into 
nothingness.13 Following this famous letter, nihilism as a “term was generally 
connected with atheism and with a rejection of all existing sources of authority by 
critics such as Jacobi and Jean Paul, and later by Turgenev, and Dostoevsky. They 
were all convinced that if the I was posited as absolute, God was nothing, and that 
without God all authority could have no other basis than shifting human will and 
                                                     
12 Slocombe (2005), p. 1. 
13 Weller (2008), pp. 1-2. 
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opinion.”14 The connection of nihilism with atheism and the refusal of authority 
then grew even more pronounced when Russian radicals who came to be known 
as “Nihilists” started a political movement in the 1860s which was boldly 
propagating anarchistic ideals while rejecting all forms of authority from the Tsar 
to the Russian Orthodox Church to the aristocracy.15  
Nietzsche referred to nihilism as the “uncanniest of all guests”. If nihilism is 
a guest, then it is certainly not the kind of the guest that would feel embarrassed 
about entering our home: it has come without invitation and will proceed without 
hesitation. 16 Being uncanny, it will exude an eerie atmosphere; one does not 
know what to expect from it, but it is evident that its presence is palpably 
unsettling and is felt by everyone. Generally speaking, the notion of nihilism, even 
though its meaning is not unequivocally clear – in fact, it can denote several things 
at the same time – conveys an overwhelmingly negative sense: one expects 
something dreadful, sinister, destructive. As Weller observes, “Since its 
introduction into the discourse on modernity at the time of the French Revolution, 
targets for the charge of nihilism have included atheism, Christianity, Judaism, 
rationality, metaphysics, ontology, transcendental idealism, logocentrism, 
deconstruction, technology, democracy, Nazism, fascism, socialism, bolshevism, 
humanism, and anti-humanism.”17 Indeed, nihilism has been tied to almost any 
movement or –ism that appeared to be undesirable or hostile to its adversaries.18 
Nevertheless, nihilism has not exclusively been characterized as negative or 
destructive. Marmysz comments that nihilism can – and has been – viewed as 
something positive or productive as well: a field or a ground that allows for 
previously unknown creative forces to appear. 
 
The problem of nihilism (…) is nothing new. It is, in fact, a perennial 
                                                     
14 Gillespie (2015), p. 80. 
15 Crosby (1988), p.4. 
16 Metzger (2009a), p.1: “The figure of the guest, ‘standing at the door,’ suggests that he is foreign, an 
outsider or alien from whom one can safely dissociate or differentiate oneself. The fact that nihilism is 
the ‘uncanniest of all guests,’ however, suggests that he makes our home itself foreign and alien; his 
chill figure is not simply unwelcome, it renders us homeless (heimatlos).” 
17 Weller (2011), pp. 9-10. 
18 In the case of Leo Strauss, Nazism was the infamous manifestation and embodiment of German 
nihilism. See: Strauss (1999), pp. 357-358: “The fact of the matter is that German nihilism is not absolute 
nihilism, desire for the destruction of everything including oneself, but a desire for the destruction of 
something specific: of modern civilisation. That, if I may say so, limited nihilism becomes an almost 
absolute nihilism only for this reason: because the negation of modem civilisation, the No, is not guided, 
or accompanied, by any clear positive conception. German nihilism desires the destruction of modem 
civilisation as far as modern civilisation has a moral meaning.” 
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concern and a source of anxiety that has had an influence upon human 
life and thought throughout history. A phenomenon that has affected both 
individuals and whole cultures, nihilism has been likened to a “malaise,” 
a “cancer,” and a “sickness,” while also having been called a “divine way 
of thinking,” and an inspiration to artists and scholars. Nihilism has been 
deemed both a “disease” and a “cure”; something to be feared as well as 
welcomed. In short, it is a phenomenon that has been considered both an 
evil and a good.19 
 
What positive features could nihilism possibly hold? For one thing, if one is to 
begin anything from scratch, nihilism is the sweeping power that has the potential 
to erase anything that would otherwise stand in the way and hinder the creation of 
revolutionary novelties. In order to give life to something new, naturally, 
something old needs to give way to it. As things stand, the old typically does not 
want to give up its place voluntarily to the new. The movement of nihilism can 
provide the necessary thrust that sets the emerging innovative forces free. That is 
why Nietzsche believed that a new beginning – which was symbolized in Thus 
Spoke Zarathustra by the carefree and obliviously inventive play of the child – 
necessitates the prior destruction of the aged “tables of value”. Accordingly, Baker 
adds, “Nietzsche believed that the outcome of nihilism – the death of God – is 
itself the opportunity for what he terms ‘the great liberation’. Not the inexistence 
of God but his death”20  
The “death of God” stands for the lack of values, the pervading 
meaninglessness and the perceived futility of human life. Since the belief in the 
metaphysical truths and the entire Christian mega-narrative has crumbled, man 
has nowhere to turn but towards his innermost self. The triumph of subjectivity, 
whose gradual expansion began with the renaissance and Descartes, has come to 
its completion in the nihilistic individualisms of Stirner and Nietzsche. However, 
this supposed triumph is, in fact, also a staggering defeat, for the subject of 
epistemology, the ego cogito that has objectified the entire world, could not avoid 
the undesired outcome of objectifying itself as well in the end. Man has become 
just another field of inquiry for science, therefore the distance between himself 
and his knowledge of himself grew steadily until it came to be no longer 
bridgeable. Hence the self has lost touch with its authentic selfhood which points 
                                                     
19 Marmysz (2003), p.1. 
20 Baker (2018), p.1. 
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outside of its individual self and which could provide meaning and values. 
 
The triumph of subjectivity is self-destructive, because it has inflated the 
human ego without developing self-respect, the true basis of agency, and 
the social character of human vision. Moreover, the triumph of ‘Man’ 
necessitated the death of God. But, since God had been the sole source 
of our values and the origin of all meaningfulness, the death of God only 
accelerated the spread of a latent culture of nihilism, cancer of the spirit, 
contagion of despair.21 
 
As we have seen in the Introduction, Nishitani attended Heidegger’s lectures on 
Nietzsche’s Nihilism and has followed Heidegger’s philosophical etiology as to 
the causes of the spiritual pathology of western civilization. Heidegger famously 
claimed that the process of nihilism is an inevitable one, since it is practically 
coded into the advancing self-oblivion of western metaphysics. In other words, it 
could not have happened in any other way; it was the “destiny” of European 
intellectual history to have nihilism emerge from its underbelly at a certain point 
and allow it to blossom. 22  In Heidegger’s view, even though Nietzsche 
maintained that western metaphysics had ended and a new epoch had begun with 
him, Nietzsche was, indeed, still operating from within the same tradition that 
held him captive.23 Heidegger, in a strikingly similar way as Nietzsche before 
him, asserted that he was the first one in the history of philosophy who had 
succeeded in overcoming the failings of the self-destructive western metaphysics 
and had instigated a new way of philosophizing; to be precise, a new way of 
thinking (Denken).  
How did Heidegger see mankind’s responsibility in bringing about the advent 
of nihilism? 
 
For Heidegger, modern man is ‘empty’ and estranged from the world, 
incapable of valuing, moved only by the restlessness of his ‘will to will’, 
by his sense of some endless possibility to enhance his subjectivity. 
Perhaps it would seem logical to conclude that, for Heidegger, modern 
                                                     
21 Levin (1988), p. 4. 
22 Although not everyone agrees with Heidegger on this particular point. Rosen for instance states – 
Rosen (1969), p. xiv. – that, although the danger of nihilism is a permanent human possibility, the actual 
pervasive presence of nihilism today is due to a series of specific philosophical decisions in the past.” 
23 Mortensen (1994), pp.138-139. 
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man embodies the nihil, that modern man is the ‘nothing’ – yet, at 
precisely this point we would be wrong. (…) Aims are not lacking; they 
are, for modern man, everywhere and always bound up with the most 
important being – the self, my self, this one and no other, me. But is it not 
in this that, for Heidegger, a historically intensified forgetfulness of 
Being might lie? In other words, is modern man not the historical 
embodiment of near-absolute forgetfulness in which what Heidegger 
calls ‘everydayness’ becomes the only horizon of self- and world-
understanding? And, in this sense, is modern man not the central 
character of destructive nihilism?24 
 
It is ambiguous, to say the least, as to whether Heidegger holds “modern man” 
morally accountable for unleashing – and, on occasion, actively implementing – 
the destructive powers of nihilism. His account of the History of Being seems to 
imply that the processes of history are destined to happen the way they do and the 
way they will do. On the other hand, it would be difficult to ignore the morally 
highly saturated rhetoric Heidegger tends to use whenever he analyzes and, in 
effect, criticizes modern science and particularly modern technology for enabling 
the spread of nihilism and the spiritual impoverishment of human existence. Yet, 
it is also Heidegger who pays heed to the developments of other intellectual and 
spiritual traditions, namely, Chinese and Japanese thought, and sometimes 
incorporates them – usually without giving them much credit – into his later 
philosophy. The fact that – and the manner in which – he keeps open the 
possibility of a renewal of western thinking, a “second beginning” by which 
nihilism would be surpassed is clearly significant. Furthermore, the key to the 
overcoming of nihilism in Heidegger might already be there in the movement of 
nihilism itself. As Cunningham perceptively observed, nihilism in its true sense 
cannot be such a one-sided negative phenomenon as it is regularly portrayed in a 
rather overly simplified fashion. 
 
This conundrum merely points to the obvious fact that nihilism may lack 
God, but it also lacks this lack of God. Accompanying any radical 
absence is an absence of absence, and so to attribute a negativity to 
nihilism is one-sided. This type of accusation articulates its protestation 
                                                     
24 Costea and Amiridis (2011), pp. 21-22. 
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only ‘within the sides’ of a metaphysical imputation, since it must 
presume the absence of nihilism so as to be able to accuse it. Such 
accusation takes the form of deeming nihilism nihilistic, and this, it is 
argued, need not be the case (…) If we are to speak seriously of nihilism 
we must, it seems, understand nihilism precisely to be an absence of 
nihilism: nihilism is not nihilistic. (...) Nihilism will provide values, gods, 
and most of all, it seems, intelligibility. Indeed, as we shall see, nihilism 
generates an excessive intelligibility.25  
 
3. Nothingness, Emptiness and the Self in Japanese Philosophy and 
Psychotherapy 
 
If one accepts the above claim that nihilism is not nihilistic after all, that is to 
say, beyond its naturally destructive characteristics it has a positive aspect as well 
which permits new values and new meanings to emerge, one still wonders where 
these new values and meanings may rise from? If nothing exists any longer, if all 
that has been, is irretrievably lost, and the beings as we used to know them are no 
more, then the only fountainhead from which the new values could possibly spring 
forth is, indeed, nothingness itself. But what is nothingness? Is it a thing among 
others? If it is, how does it differ from any other being? Or is it perhaps a radically 
different reality which cannot be characterized by the traditional apparatus of 
ontology? 
The advancement of nihilism has been whirling onward ruinously until it has 
reached its most radical conclusion, which is this: it can no longer destruct without 
having to build and create something new. The way beyond nihilism leads through 
it, as both Nietzsche and Nishitani agreed, so one cannot simply shy away or shun 
the consequences of its relentless advancement. The most immediate consequence 
of this progress is that it is impossible to turn back to the same values and the 
same narratives which were still valid before nihilism commenced its vicious ride. 
However, it is still possible to grab hold of that which is alive and life-giving in 
the old and make use of it for the new to come. As Nishitani argues: 
 
Both Dostoevsky and Nietzsche anticipated the nihilism that was to come, 
and dared to descend to the depths of history and humanity to struggle 
                                                     
25 Cunningham (2002), p. 170. 
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desperately against it. They can even lead us Japanese to the nihilism 
lurking in the ground of our historical actuality. But in order for us to 
take up the struggle, we need our own means. The way to overcome it 
must be of our own creation. Only then will the spiritual culture of the 
Orient which has been handed down through the ages be revitalized in a 
new transformation.26 
 
Nishitani was convinced that the way out of nihilism could only be reached by 
dipping into its heart and coming face to face with nothingness itself. One is 
instinctively reluctant to turn away from being and to bend instead towards 
nothingness, for nonbeing and nothingness are generally considered to be 
analogous with death and extinction which every healthy living instinct wants to 
avoid. Nevertheless, as Heidegger emphatically referred to nothingness as 
something that can be experienced in the existential mode of anxiety (Angst) 
which brings one’s most authentic possibility for being to one’s awareness, the 
encounter of nothingness is not only inevitable but it is also desirable; desirable 
in the sense that it facilitates the displacement of something worse, i.e. the all too 
powerful self-destructive strand of nihilism. The direct experience of existential 
anxiety, along with Dasein’s running-forward-to-death and the chilling encounter 
of nothingness amidst the moment of Angst are justifiably dreaded scenarios that 
one would never look forward to. Yet, precisely this experience is that exceptional 
one which, by displaying the groundlessness of one’s existence prepares one for 
the acceptance of a vision that demands no grounds for humans to be able to exist 
and even to thrive and flourish happily in life.  
Despite the fact that Buddhism has been frequently accused, even by 
Nietzsche himself, of being through and through nihilistic and life-denying, 
Nishitani insists that “there is in Mahayana a standpoint that cannot be reached 
even by nihilism”. He quickly adds though that, “For the present this standpoint 
remains buried in the tradition of the past, far from historical actuality.” 27 Yet, 
this standpoint, which is the standpoint of nothingness or emptiness, is still 
potentially accessible for the seeking mind: one only needs to unearth the origins 
of the concepts of nothingness and emptiness and then witness how they endow 
with new values and meanings the moribund words and notions of our language 
and our narratives that had been long besieged by the negative forces of nihilism. 
                                                     
26 Nishitani (1990), p. 181. 
27 Op. cit., p. 180-181. 
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During the time when Nishitani’s predecessor, the originator of the Kyoto 
School, Nishida Kitarō was a young intellectual seeking out a way to wed the 
ancient insights of Zen Buddhism28 with the nomenclatures of modern western-
style philosophy, taking good use of the antique texts of Buddhism was not an 
approach that was in the vogue in Japan. As the government dispatched many of 
its brightest young students and professionals to Europe and the United States in 
order “to acquire the necessary knowledge and skills for modernization”, the prior 
body of knowledge that was founded on Indian, Chinese and ancient Japanese 
religious texts and on dated scholarly discussions came to be heavily criticized 
and eventually abandoned by the most.29 While the Japanese were looking for 
their identity, the religious past and the modernizing scientific present, especially 
in medical and religious circles, competed and clashed with each other.30 
 
At the outset, the explicitly expressed guiding principle of modernization 
in Japan was to borrow western technology and science but maintain 
Asian values. As the process unfolded, however, it became clear to many 
leading Japanese intellectuals that modernization brought with it ideas of 
self, society, knowledge, education, and ethics that ran counter to many 
traditional Buddhist, Confucian, and Shinto values. (…) In response to 
the new ideas from the West, a great many philosophers in the Japanese 
academy simply abandoned the premodern traditions as sources for their 
work, devoting themselves entirely to expositions and critiques of major 
western figures.31 
 
Sensing the damaging effects of this clash between the old and the new yet 
deliberately refusing to take sides, Nishida, and, about the same time, Morita 
Masatake, a famed psychiatrist at the prestigious Jikei University opted for 
elevating Buddhism back into the mainstream of philosophical and scientific 
discourses. In order to do this, they took advantage of the rich cultural heritage of 
                                                     
28 On Nishida’s Zen Buddhist practice of zazen in search of enlightenment see for example Uehara 
(2019), p. 578. 
29 Heisig et. al. (2011a), p.15: “Along with medicine, engineering, agriculture, postal systems, and 
education, knowledge of western thought was prized as a means to understand the foundations of modern 
society and the ideas behind western science and technology. Naturally, this would involve intimate 
familiarity with western philosophy. After a brief period of interest in British utilitarianism and 
American pragmatism, Japanese philosophers began to look to Germany for guidance.” 
30 Harding (2015), pp. 4-12. 
31 Heisig et. al. (2011a), p.15-16. 
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two well-respected archaic East Asian philosophical concepts: nothingness and 
emptiness. Nishida by planting the notion of absolute nothingness into the center 
of his conceptual framework and elaborating its crucial significance with regard 
to epistemology and ethics, whereas Morita by creating a unique form of 
psychotherapeutic practice which he based on the emptying of the self and on 
accepting reality as it is, the pragmatic reappropriation of these two concepts for 
modern Japan had began to take shape.  
As Deguchi explains, nothingness and emptiness are “among the most 
important philosophical terms in East Asian thoughts. Emptiness, as a 
philosophical term, has an Indian origin; it is śūnyatā in Sanskrit, and was 
formulated in Mahāyāna Buddhism, particularly in the Paramīta sūtras and the 
Mādhyamaka school. On the other hand, nothingness came from Chinese Daoism, 
especially the doctrine of reverence for nothingness”32  Nishida differentiates 
between relative and absolute nothingness. Whereas relative nothingness is 
relative to being, in other words, it is the denial and negation of a particular form 
of being, absolute nothingness is not relative to anything (thus it is absolute). To 
put it differently, absolute nothingness (zettai mu) is not determined or delineated 
by anything else. It is a place (basho) which encompasses anything else and from 
which particular beings form and emerge. As Krummel elucidates, it is the 
“horizonless horizon that contextualizes and makes possible every determination 
of being as well as their negation”.33 Nishida’s position is akin to the Mahāyāna 
notion of the middle path or the emptiness of emptiness which stands between the 
negative (and relative) nothingness of nihilism and a substantialized version of 
nothingness which is liable to turn nothingness into yet another form of supreme 
being (similar to God or Being).34  
As Heisig observes, “One of the core ideas associated with the Kyoto School 
philosophers is that of a self-awareness in which the self awakens to its true nature 
as no-self.” 35  Regarding Nishida, the negation of the self and the goal of 
becoming the thing itself is a crucial part of his philosophical program from the 
outset. Becoming one with reality in a primordial, non-dual awareness is one of 
the principal goals of Nishida already in Inquiry into the Good, his first major 
                                                     
32 Deguchi (2014), p. 300: “When the Mahāyāna idea of emptiness was introduced into China, it was 
sometimes translated and explained as nothingness. Since then, these terms have been largely taken as 
synonyms in Buddhist philosophical discourse.” 
33 Krummel (2014), p. 272. 
34 Krummel (2014), p. 281. 
35 Heisig (2016), p. 187. 
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philosophical work. In order to this, in order to become united with reality in a 
non-dual awareness it is necessary to learn to empty the self and see things as they 
truly are without our subjective distortions and our reflexive interpretations.36 
When the subject and the object are completely joined in a single awareness, that 
is when the ego-self gets forgotten, and the totality of the experience may come 
to the fore. For the early Nishida the concept of “pure experience” was the starting 
point that was supposed to enable the self to rise above the subject-object division. 
Knowing things as they are is the goal of both philosophy and life in general, yet 
this kind of knowledge can only be acquired intuitively, according to Nishida. 
Pure experience is supposed to break through the ego-centered view of the self 
and reveal reality in an originary way. According to this view, the true or authentic 
self can only be encountered in pure experience when the self is lost in some kind 
of activity. At that moment the self loses its sense of itself and becomes completely 
“sincere”. This kind of sincerity appears spontaneously as soon as the awareness 
of the ego-self disappears. 
Losing the self in a non-reflexive activity serves as the key to understanding 
Morita Masatake’s approach to psychotherapy as well. As a psychiatrist his chief 
aim was to find a method which would successfully treat neurotic patients 
suffering from anxiety-related diseases and depression. Similarly to Nishida, 
Morita was also not propagating Buddhism out in the open but decided rather to 
let his theory (and practice) be influenced by Zen Buddhist tenets and values in a 
more subtle manner. The tacit application of the arugamama principle which 
entails accepting reality as it is, without illusions and without self-deception, 
coupled with the self-emptying process that occurs while the patient is lead to 
directly face his or her problems and thus to build up a novel relation to the world 
from the ground up are essential features of Morita therapy.37 According to this 
approach, reality can be experienced in a fundamentally different way than what 
we are used to in our everyday involvement with things and with other people. 
When one candidly and directly engages with the ever-changing stream of 
existence, a much deeper sort of involvement with reality can result whereby one 
comes to encounter the fine and delicately tangible events in the natural order of 
things. This experience is tantamount to losing one’s egoistic self and waking up 
to a new self that is safely grounded in the natural environment and is naturally 
selfless and compassionate. This new selfless self, by negating itself and through 
                                                     
36 Carter (2013), p. 31. 
37 Morita, Shōma (1998), pp. 3-34. 
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disentangling itself from its own neurotic preoccupation with itself does not fall 
prey to the self-destructive tendencies of nihilism, albeit it does not cease to 
acknowledge the emptiness of its existence either.38 Being completely immersed 
in the flux of reality the awareness of the subject merges into the tranquil and 
engaged observation of what appears in the field of consciousness. This might 
remind us of Nishida’s notion of “sincerity” and the disappearance of the self 
amidst the pure experience of reality. 
Turning back once again to Nishitani, one can readily observe how his 
analysis had been influenced by Nishida, and at the same, how he diverged from 
his predecessor in significant ways. Krummel points out that “Nishitani, 
borrowing the schema of Nishida, distinguishes emptiness as absolute 
nothingness (J. zettai mu) from nihility as relative nothingness (J. sōtai mu).”39 
However, in Nishitani’s explanation “absolute negation” (zettai hitei) as the 
negation of negation becomes the “great affirmation” (ōkina kōtei), and it is on 
the Buddhist standpoint of emptiness as absolute “nothingness” that nihilism can 
be penetrated and thus overcome. In Religion and Nothingness, Nishitani 
distinguishes three different standpoints or modes of existence which correspond 
to the three fields of consciousness, nihility, and emptiness. Davis sums it up the 
following way:  
 
On the field of consciousness (by which he means subjective, dualistic 
consciousness), we purport to know other persons and things; but in fact 
what we know are merely our own subjective representations of them. 
On the field of nihility (…) one realizes that there is an “absolute breach” 
between one’s subjective consciousness and the things or persons it 
purports to represent. However, on the field of emptiness, one realizes 
that this “absolute breach” that distances one person or thing from 
another at the same time “points directly to a most intimate encounter 
with everything that exists.” This “intimate encounter” is possible 
because underneath the abyss of nihility that separates subjective 
consciousness from everything else lies the field of emptiness that unites 
things in their differences.40 
 
                                                     
38 Chervenkova, Velizara (2017), pp. 45-60. 
39 Krummel (2019). p. 660. 
40 Davis (2017), p. 243. 
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The field of emptiness in Nishitani’s analysis has a unifying power that breaks 
down the individual differences of the subjects and provides a groundless ground 
upon which the experience of values and meanings is possible yet again. As we 
may remember, nihilism has announced its arrival by bringing into awareness the 
meaninglessness of life and the valuelessness of all values. At a later point, 
however, nihilism came to its most radical when the emergence of new values and 
new meanings was bound to happen once again, owing to the activation of the 
positive forces that lie beneath the negative veneer of the movement of nihilism. 
“When things appear to be ultimately meaningless, without substance, we are 
forced by the negation of what we had taken for granted to take a step back to see 
the reality of our existence under a new light. This marks a fundamental 
conversion of life that comes to question our ego-centric and anthropo-centric 
assumptions”.41 
A conversion of an earlier self-centered vantage point to a selfless and 
altruistic one is also a hallmark feature of Naikan therapy which is another 
Japanese psychotherapeutic approach founded upon a venerable Buddhist 
tradition. The founder of Naikan therapy, Yoshimoto Ishin was a Shin Buddhist 
priest who created Naikan (“introspection”) therapy out of the ancient ascetic 
practice of mishirabe the aim of which was the attainment of enlightenment 
(satori). Naikan theory emphasizes the interconnectedness of beings, and, in 
particular, the individual’s sinful forgetfulness of his or her indebtedness to others. 
During the course of the highly structured procedure of the therapy the clients are 
to meditate on and come to terms with their self-serving narratives of the past, 
while realizing how biased their preferred ways of remembrances vis-á-vis their 
roles in past events have been. As soon as one learns to see one’s life and the 
significance of other people’s assistance in one’s life in a less self-absorbed and 
self-protective manner, one will become more compassionate and feel 
reconnected to society and nature as a whole.42 Emptying the self, realizing an 
objective view of reality, and finding meaning in the appreciation of and 
gratefulness for one’s immediate environment (family, friends, the Nature) are the 
ultimate goals of Naikan therapy. 
Letting go is the key to Naikan therapy. One lets go of one’s old, false image 
of the self and of the world. However, instead of being reborn or transformed into 
                                                     
41 Krummel (2019). p. 657. 
42 Chervenkova (2017), pp. 81-128. 
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a new self, it is not the self but rather the world that changes form. It simply occurs 
as a result of the self’s realization concerning its deep interconnectedness with the 
world: the self stops seeing the world as something external to itself. The 
transformed self is transformed because it does not prioritize itself over other 
selves any longer. One learns in Naikan that the world has blurry boundaries, and 
by caring for the world the self sustains itself just as much as the world sustains 
itself by caring for the self. If I cause you pain the pain I cause you causes me 
pain, too; for although you are not me and I am not you, you and I are not entirely 
separate, either. The sincere and profound gratitude one feels during and after 
Naikan for one’s family and friends and for one’s life in general brings one to the 
understanding as to our essential belonging with one another, with our ever 




Having compared in a concise manner how Nishida, Morita, Nishitani and 
Yoshimoto have addressed the problems of meaninglessness, valuelessness and 
egocentrism that are all recognized to be the results of a pervasive nihilism that is 
present in our contemporary culture we came to the position where it will be 
possible to draw on the commonalities in their respective views. First of all, all 
four of these thinkers seem to agree that the only approach which is capable of 
transcending nihilism leads through the realization of the emptiness of the self. 
This view, in turn, demands to see reality as it is, beyond the false subject-object 
dichotomy. As Nishitani would stress, only by going through nihilism can one 
overcome it. Nishida and Nishitani both suggested a criterion with reference to 
attaining the objective of transcending the self-defeating self-centered vision of 
modernity that is virtually the same criterion that the aforementioned Japanese 
psychotherapists set as a goal. This criterion consists in allowing the self and other 
beings, via a transformative personal conversion, to become manifest in their 
“suchness” (shinnyo) so that the self could achieve an egoless tranquility from 
which it would become able to see its original connectedness to other beings. The 
ideal of the enlightened or selfless self looking at it from this revitalized Buddhist 
perspective is a self which is infinitely more embedded in the world than was ever 
before. The arugamama principle which demands the acceptance of things as they 
                                                     
43 Ozawa de-Silva (2006).  
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are instead of fleeing into imaginary scenarios or focusing monomaniacally on the 
ego’s petty concerns, is believed to be crucial for the individual’s well-being (and 
also for the healthy functioning of society as a whole).  
Standing on this rejuvenated standpoint of emptiness qua nothingness one 
does not purport to have buried once and for all the problem of nihilism or the 
quandary of the groundlessness that opens up underfoot whenever one sincerely 
examines one’s rapidly dissolving existential bases. Perhaps the self-destructive 
and self-reorganizing traits of nihilism are vital components to its movement that 
is eternally vying with(in) itself. The human self that both causes the suffering 
and is subject to the suffering it causes may be better off if it were conceived as 
an entity that lacks a substantial core, devoid of an unchanging and indestructible 
center. Perhaps the self could be posited instead as a locus of emptiness wherein 
new values and new meanings are created spontaneously and automatically as 
soon as the self stops concentrating on itself and, as a prudent alternative, opens 
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